
this is me Mart and Paul at our most recent Garden Party Event at North Tyneside Disability Forum. We had a great time with a live band called Baldy Holly
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this is me Mart and Paul at our most recent Garden Party Event at North Tyneside Disability Forum. We had a great time with a live band called Baldy Holly
During the First World War, (WWI) communication technology was changing very quickly. For the first time, much of the world was using electricity, and this new source of power was utilized for communication in the form of telegraphs, telephones, signal lamps, and radio.
From the very beginnings of military warfare communication often holds the keys to
victory. Communicating with your allies while knowing where your enemies are is one
of the most crucial parts in war. After all, in military ranks the common saying is that,
“knowing is half the battle.” Military communication has evolved throughout the ages
from flaming arrows, drum beats, smoke signals, messenger pigeons, to modern
satellite enabled communication devices.
However,technology was not always the best way to communicate with the Marines on the front lines. Weather, terrain, and the enemy could break the electric lines that connected the Marines to their commanders.
While instant communication was preferred, Marines often had to use proven methods of communication used by the Marines, the United States military, and their allies throughout the WW1.
Signal Flags
Before the inventions of the telegraph, telephone and two-way radio, ships would communicate
with a series two-way radio, ships would communicate with a series of signals by using flags.
Signal flags are a uniform set of easily identifiable nautical codes used to convey visual messages and signals between two ships or from ship to shore. They are based on an internationally recognized set of codes referred to as the International Code of Signals published in nine different languages; English, French, Italian, German, Japanese, Spanish, Norwegian, Russian and Greek.
Naval flag signaling can be traced back to medieval times but the first well documented
case of communication by signal flags was that of the British fleet during the
Napoleonic Wars. Signal flags have been used for both communicating between
different ships at sea as well as between ships and shore. Whenever forming and
preparing to use naval tactics, it is imperative that different ships be able to
communicate with one another in order to complete complicated maneuvers. For
example, during the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, British naval forces under the
command of Admiral Lord Nelson effectively used flag signals to form 27 British ships
under his command into complex battle formations before meeting a superior force of
33 French and Spanish ships. Upon meeting enemy forces, Admiral Nelson had a flag
signal raised that read “England expects that every man will do his duty”, providing the
patriotic encouragement needed to win the battle.
Flag signals may also be used to communicate messages between different ships that
are close to one another. Often this occurs because they are performing dangerous
operations, such as when refueling at sea (and thus a sitting target). While it may be
possible nowadays to make a radio message that a ship is refueling, it is incomplete if
it does not provide information as to where that specific ship is located in order for it to
be avoided.
Semaphore
During the French Revolution in 1792, Claude Chappe invented the semaphore line system. This was a method of communication using a series of visual signals and rotating paddles.
The message was encoded by the position of the
paddles. The message can then be read when the paddles paddles are in a fixed position
This system proved to be much faster than a horse and rider, and once constructed proved
to be a much more cost efficient way of sending messages. In 1792 Chappe
constructed 556 semaphore towers throughout France, spanning 3,000 miles. This
method of communication would be used by the French military until the 1850s.
In 1792 Chappe constructed 556 semaphore towers throughout France, spanning 3,000 miles. This method of communication would be used by the French military until the 1850s.
Wig Wag
Wig wag was developed by U.S. Army Major Albert Myer during the American Civil
War. Based upon the idea of Morse code (each letter being represented by a series of
dots and dashes), this method uses one flag that is waved back and forth in a series of
“wags” to represent each letter of the message. There are two basic wig wag flags, one white with a red center and one red with a white center. The white flag was used at
dusk or dawn (times of day with low light or low visibility) and the red was used during days with bright sunshine. Each letter has three basic movements: down to the left, down to the right, or down in front of the signalman. Since this code was based upon Morse Code, it could take up to
five waves of the flag for a single letter. To the untrained eye, it looked as though the signalman was just “wagging” the flag around in no particular order, giving it the name
“wig wag.” Marines would utilize wig wag through the end of WWI, and would change to the more widely used system of semaphore during WWII.
Telegraph and Morse code
The electric telegraph sends an electric current to a receiving station. When the sender
presses on the telegraph key he interrupts the current creating an audible pulse that is
heard at the receiving station. It cannot carry voice or other data, and relies only on
pulses to communicate. The receiver on the other end decodes the pulses to decode
the message. Several electric telegraphs were being developed in Europe, and in
1836 Samuel Morse and Alfred Vail developed their own prototype.
Morse code is a system of sending messages by a series of on-off tones, lights or
clicks. Each letter is represented by a unique series of short dots (dits) and longer
dashes (dahs). The duration of a dash is three times the length of a dot. Each word is
separated by silence in the equivalent of one dash. It is very important that the
transmitter be consistent, or the message might be misread completely! Morse
developed his code after seeing the optical, or semaphore telegraph, in Europe.
The widespread use of telegraph was quickly accepted, as it allowed information to be
transmitted between telegraph stations almost instantly, rather than the weeks it took
for a horse and rider. The technology was also accepted world-wide, with extensive
systems appearing across Europe. By 1866 the first permanent telegraph cable was
laid across the Atlantic Ocean.
During WWI, electric telegraphs were used throughout the war, on both sides. They
were used to communicate from the front line trenches to the officers, and from nation
to nation via telegraph lines throughout Europe and across the Atlantic, telegraph
machines allowed governments and their leaders to instantly receive information on
troop movements, battle outcomes, and other crucial information.
SOS: The internationally accepted distress signal ··· – – – ···
First adopted in Germany in 1905, the ‘SOS’ three letter message quickly became the
internationally recognized message for distress. While it is often thought it means
“save our ship”, it actually does not stand for anything. The three letter message is
easy to remember, which is crucial during emergencies. SOS remained the official
maritime distress signal until 1999 when the Global Maritime Distress Safety System
was created. SOS is still recognized as a visual signal of distress.
Our Community partners, North Tyneside Disability Forum have some great icons for patrons to idolise. One of my favourite is Mr followers he always makes me smile on coming to our park View Project it space. Hope this brings a smile to my fellow bloggers.
The Home Guard (initially Local Defence Volunteers or LDV) was an armed citizen militia supporting the British Army during the Second World War. Operational from 1940 to 1944, the Home Guard had 1.5 million local volunteers otherwise ineligible for military service, such as those who were too young or too old to join the regular armed services (regular military service was restricted to those aged 18 to 41) and those in reserved occupations. Excluding those already in the armed services, the civilian police or civil defence, approximately one in five men were volunteers. Their role was to act as a secondary defence force in case of invasion by the forces of Nazi Germany.
The Home Guard were to try to slow down the advance of the enemy even by a few hours to give the regular troops time to regroup. They were also to defend key communication points and factories in rear areas against possible capture by paratroops or fifth columnists. A key purpose was to maintain control of the civilian population in the event of an invasion, to forestall panic and to prevent communication routes from being blocked by refugees to free the regular forces to fight the Germans. The Home Guard continued to man roadblocks and guard the coastal areas of the United Kingdom and other important places such as airfields, factories and explosives stores until late 1944, when they were stood down. They were finally disbanded on 31 December 1945, eight months after Germany’s surrender.
Men aged 17 to 65 years could join, although the upper age limit was not strictly enforced. Service was unpaid but gave a chance for older or inexperienced soldiers to support the war effort.
The origins of the Second World War Home Guard can be traced to Captain Tom Wintringham, who returned from the Spanish Civil War and wrote a book entitled How to Reform the Army. In the book, as well as many regular army reforms, Wintringham called for the creation of 12 divisions similar in composition to that of the International Brigades, which had been formed in Spain during the conflict. The divisions would be raised by voluntary enlistment targeting ex-servicemen and youths. Despite great interest by the War Office in the book’s assertion that ‘security is possible’, Wintringham’s call to train 100,000 men immediately was not implemented.
When Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, debates began in official circles about the possible ways in which the German military might invade Britain. In the first week of the conflict, numerous diplomatic and intelligence reports seemed to indicate that there was the possibility of an imminent German amphibious assault.Many government ministers and senior army officials, including the Commander in Chief Home Forces, General Walter Kirke, believed that the threat of invasion was greatly exaggerated and were sceptical, but others were not, including Winston Churchill, the new First Lord of the Admiralty.
Churchill argued that some form of home defence force should be raised from people who were ineligible to serve in the regular forces but wished to serve their country. In a letter to Samuel Hoare, the Lord Privy Seal, on 8 October 1939, Churchill called for a Home Guard force of 500,000 men over the age of 40 to be formed.
While government officials were debating the need for a home defence force, such a force was actually being formed without any official encouragement. In Essex, men not eligible for call-up into the armed forces were coming forward to join the self-styled “Legion of Frontiersmen“. Officials were soon informed of the development of the legion, with the Adjutant-General, Sir Robert Gordon-Finlayson, arguing that the government should encourage the development of more unofficial organisations. The fear of invasion in 1939 quickly dissipated as it became evident that the German military was not in a position to launch an invasion of Britain; official enthusiasm for home defence forces waned and the legion appears to have dissolved itself at the same time.
The Battle of France began on 10 May 1940, with the Wehrmacht invading Belgium, the Netherlands and France. By 20 May, German forces had reached the English Channel, and on 28 May, the Belgian Army surrendered. The combination of the large-scale combined operations mounted by the Wehrmacht during the invasion of Norway in April and the prospect that much of the English Channel coast would soon be occupied made the prospect of a German invasion of the British Isles alarmingly real. Fears of an invasion grew rapidly, spurred on by reports both in the press and from official government bodies, of a fifth column operating in Britain that would aid an invasion by German airborne forces.
The government soon found itself under increasing pressure to extend the internment of suspect aliens to prevent the formation of a fifth column and to allow the population to take up arms to defend themselves against an invasion. Calls for some form of home defence force soon began to be heard from the press and from private individuals. The press baron Lord Kemsley privately proposed to the War Office that rifle clubs form the nucleus of a home defence force, and Josiah Wedgwood, a Labour MP, wrote to the prime minister asking that the entire adult population be trained in the use of arms and given weapons to defend themselves. Similar calls appeared in newspaper columns: in the 12 May issue of the Sunday Express, a brigadier called on the government to issue free arms licences and permits to buy ammunition to men possessing small arms, and the same day, the Sunday Pictorial asked if the government had considered training golfers in rifle shooting to eliminate stray parachutists.

The calls alarmed government and senior military officials, who worried about the prospect of the population forming private defence forces that the army would not be able to control, and in mid-May, the Home Office issued a press release on the matter. It was the task of the army to deal with enemy parachutists, as any civilians who carried weapons and fired on German troops were likely to be executed if captured. Moreover, any lone parachutist descending from the skies in the summer of 1940 was far more likely to be a downed RAF airman than a German Fallschirmjäger.
Nevertheless, private defence forces soon began to be formed throughout the country, often sponsored by employers seeking to bolster defence of their factories. This placed the government in an awkward position. The private forces, which the army might not be able to control, could well inhibit the army’s efforts during an invasion, but to ignore the calls for a home defence force to be set up would be politically problematic.[4] An officially-sponsored home defence force would allow the government greater control and also allow for greater security around vulnerable areas such as munitions factories and airfields; but there was some confusion over who would form and control the force, with separate plans drawn up by the War Office and General Headquarters Home Forces under General Kirke.
The government and senior military officials rapidly compared plans and, by 13 May 1940, worked out an improvised plan for a home defence force, to be called the Local Defence Volunteers (LDV). The rush to complete a plan and announce it to the public had led to a number of administrative and logistical problems, such as how the volunteers in the new force would be armed, which caused problems as the force evolved. On the evening of 14 May 1940, Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden gave a radio broadcast announcing the formation of the LDV and calling for volunteers to join the force: “You will not be paid, but you will receive a uniform and will be armed.”
In the official radio announcement, Eden called on men between the ages of 17 and 65 years in Britain who were not in military service but wished to defend their country against an invasion to enroll in the LDV at their local police station. It was anticipated that up to 500,000 men might volunteer, a number that conformed generally with the Army’s expectation of the total numbers required to fulfill the LDV’s expected functions. However, the announcement was met with much enthusiasm: 250,000 volunteers tried to sign up in the first seven days, and by July this had increased to 1.5 million. Social groups such as cricket clubs began forming their own units, but the bulk were workplace-based, especially as co-operation from employers was necessary to ensure that volunteers would be available for training and operational patrols. Indeed, many employers envisaged the LDV units primarily as protecting industrial plants from fifth column attack.
The Home Guard did not initially admit women to its ranks. Some women formed their own groups like the Amazon Defence Corps.In December 1941, a more organised but still unofficial Women’s Home Defence (WHD) was formed under the direction of Dr Edith Summerskill, Labour MP for Fulham West. WHD members were given weapons training and basic military training. Limited female involvement was permitted later, on the understanding that these would be in traditional female support roles (e.g. clerical, driving) and not in any way seen as combatants.

The War Office continued to lay down the administrative and logistical foundations for the LDV organisation. Eden’s public words were generally interpreted as an explicit promise to provide everyone who volunteered with a personal firearm. In retrospect, it was recognised that recruitment would have been better limited to the numbers required (and capable of being armed), with later volunteers given places on a waiting list. However, once volunteers had been enlisted, it was considered impossible from a public relations perspective to then dismiss them. Nevertheless, the regular forces saw no priority in providing more arms and equipment to the new force than would have been needed had numbers been properly constrained in the first place.
In telegrams to the lord lieutenants of each county it was explained that LDV units would operate in predefined military areas already used by the regular army, with a General Staff Officer coordinating with civilian regional commissioners to divide these areas into smaller zones. In London this was organised on the basis of police districts. On 17 May, the LDV achieved official legal status when the Privy Council issued the Defence (Local Defence Volunteers) Order in Council, and orders were issued from the War Office to regular army headquarters throughout Britain explaining the status of LDV units; volunteers would be divided into sections, platoons and companies but would not be paid and leaders of units would not hold commissions or have the power to command regular forces.
Implementation of the legislation proved to be extremely difficult, particularly as the primary focus of the War Office and General Headquarters Home Forces was on Operation Dynamo, the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk between 27 May and 4 June 1940. The apparent lack of focus led to many LDV members becoming impatient, particularly when it was announced that volunteers would receive only armbands printed with “L.D.V.” on them until proper uniforms could be manufactured, and there was no mention of weapons being issued to units. The impatience led to many units conducting their own patrols without official permission, often led by men who had previously served in the armed forces.
The presence of many veterans and the appointment of ex-officers as commanders of LDV units, only worsened the situation, with many believing that they did not require training before being issued weapons. That led to numerous complaints being received by the War Office and the press and to many ex-senior officers attempting to use their influence to obtain weapons or permission to begin patrolling. The issue of weapons to LDV units was particularly problematic for the War Office, as it was recognised that the rearming and reequipping of the regular forces would have to take precedence over the LDV. All civilian firearms, especially shotguns and pistols, previously were to have been handed in to local police stations[citation needed], and volunteers were allowed often by the police to retrieve these for their LDV duties[citation needed]. In rural areas, volunteer shotgun users initially organised themselves into vigilante groups, dubbed ‘the parashots’ by the press, to watch the early morning skies for German parachutists.
For public (and enemy) consumption, the government maintained that large stocks of Lee-Enfield rifles remained from the First World War, but the actual total reserve stockpile amounted to 300,000, and they had already been earmarked for the expansion of the army by 122 infantry battalions. Instead, the War Office issued instructions on how to make Molotov cocktails and emergency orders were placed for Ross rifles from Canada. In the absence of proper weapons, local units improvised weapons, especially grenades, mortars and grenade projectors, from whatever came to hand, and the legacy of self-reliant improvisation in the face of what was interpreted as official disregard and obstruction was to remain as a characteristic of the Home Guard throughout its existence.
Another problem that was encountered as the LDV was organised was the definition of the role the organisation was to play. Initially, in the eyes of the War Office and the army, the LDV was to act as ‘an armed police constabulary’, which, in the event of an invasion, was to man roadblocks, observe German troop movements, convey information to the regular forces and guard places of strategic or tactical importance. The War Office believed that the LDV would act best in such a passive role because of its lack of training, weapons and proper equipment. Such a role clashed with the expectations of LDV commanders and members who believed that the organisation would be best suited to an active role of hunting down and killing parachutists, and fifth columnists, as well as attacking and harassing German forces.
“In the popular mind it was the twin terrors of Nazi paratrooper and Fifth Columnist traitor which were the Home Guard’s nemesis, its natural enemy. Notwithstanding that the Home Guard actually spent most of its time preparing to defend ‘nodal points’ against tank attack, operating anti-aircraft artillery or locating unexploded bombs.”
The clash led to morale problems and even more complaints to the press and the War Office from LDV members who were opposed, as they saw it, the government’s leaving them defenceless and placing them in a noncombatant role. Complaints about the role of the LDV and continuing problems encountered by the War Office in its attempts to clothe and arm the LDV, led the government to respond to public pressure in August, redefining the role of the LDV to include delaying and obstructing German forces through any means possible.Also in August, the Home Office and MI5 instituted the ‘Invasion List’, a list of around 1,000 persons whose ‘recent conduct or words indicated that they were likely to assist the enemy’ and who would be apprehended by the police in the event of an invasion, hoping thereby to forestall the expectations of many LDV volunteers that they would then be empowered to act as ‘Judge, Jury and Executioner’ of potential collaborators and fifth columnists.
At the same time, Churchill, who had assumed the position of Prime Minister in May 1940, became involved in the matter after being alerted to the problems, obtaining a summary of the current LDV position from the War Office on 22 June 1940. After reviewing the summary, Churchill wrote to Eden stating that in his opinion, one of the main causes of disciplinary and morale problems stemmed from the uninspiring title of the LDV and suggesting that it be renamed as the ‘Home Guard’. Despite resistance from Eden and other government officials, who noted that one million “LDV” armbands had already been printed and the cost of printing another million ‘Home Guard’ armbands would be excessive, Churchill would not be dissuaded. On 22 July, the LDV was officially renamed the Home Guard. Churchill ruled decisively on the issue of whether civilian volunteers should actively resist German forces, even at the expense of setting themselves outside the protection of the Geneva Conventions. The ‘Rules of War’, he pointed out, had been drawn up with the express intention of avoiding defeated combatants fighting on to the last. However, in the fight against Nazism, any outcome, including the complete destruction of a town and the massacre of its population, would be preferable to its acquiescing to Nazi rule.
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The Home Guard in 1940 were an armed uniformed civilian militia, entirely distinct from the regular armed forces. Volunteers originally had no recognised military rank, were not subject to military discipline and could withdraw (or be withdrawn by their employers) at any time. In 1941, nominal ranks were introduced for Home Guard ‘officers’, and in 1942, limited conscription was implemented intended for circumstances where Home Guard forces were taking over functions from regular forces (chiefly coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries), and non-officer volunteers became ‘privates’. Volunteers remained legally civilians and failure to attend when ordered to do so was punishable by civilian authorities. Nevertheless, the British Government consistently maintained that as Home Guard service was strictly to be undertaken only in approved uniform. Uniformed volunteers would be lawful combatants within the Geneva Conventions and so would be “prisoners of war” if captured. That was an argument with a long history since armed civilian irregulars (uniformed and non-uniformed) had been widely employed by smaller combatant nations in the First World War, but former British governments had consistently refused to recognise captured irregular combatants in uniform as prisoners of war. Indeed, most of the Irish Republican volunteers executed by the British administration following the 1916 Easter Rising had been fighting or at least surrendered in full Irish Volunteer or Irish Citizen Army uniforms. However, that was an uprising or rebellion of subjects of the Crown and was not entirely comparable to combatants in a war between sovereign states.
German and Austrian military traditions were, if anything, more absolute in rejecting any recognition of civilian militia combatants as prisoners of war since the German response to the nonuniformed francs-tireurs who had attacked German forces during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. It had long been standard German military practice that civilians who attacked German troops in areas that opposing regular forces had surrendered, withdrawn or chosen not to defend should be considered properly liable to be shot out of hand. Indeed, German military doctrine had always maintained that their military forces were further entitled in such circumstances to take reprisals against unarmed local civilians – taking and executing hostages, and leveling villages: “fight chivalrously against an honest foe; armed irregulars deserve no quarter”. The actions of regular German forces during the Second World War consistently conformed to those principles: captured partisans in the Soviet Union and the Balkans, whether they were fighting in uniform or not, were killed on the spot. German radio broadcasts described the British Home Guard as ‘gangs of murderers’ and left no doubt that they would not be regarded as lawful combatants.
By the end of 1940, the Home Guard was established into 1,200 battalions, 5,000 companies and 25,000 platoons.For its primary defensive role, each section was trained and equipped to operate as a single, largely independent ‘battle platoon’, with an operational establishment of between 25 and 30 men at any one time although, as volunteers would also have full-time jobs, the numbers of volunteers in each section would be around twice that establishment. In the event of an invasion, the Home Guard battle platoons in a town would be under the overall control of an Army military commander and maintain contact with that commander with a designated ‘runner’ (no Home Guard units were issued with wireless sets until 1942), who would usually be a motorbike owner. Otherwise, the battle platoon was static and would defend a defined local area and report on enemy activity in that area, but it was neither equipped nor expected to join up with the mobile forces of the regular army. Each Home Guard unit would establish and prepare a local strongpoint, from which ‘civilians’ (non-Home Guard) would be cleared if possible, and aim to defend that strongpoint for as long as possible. It might be forced to retreat towards a neighbouring strongpoint but would not surrender so long as ammunition held out. Most towns of any size would have a number such Home Guard units, each defending its own strongpoint and providing ‘defence in depth’, which should ideally be sited to offer supporting fire to cover one another and to control road access through the town from all directions.
Each battle platoon had a headquarters section; commander, second in command, runner, and at least one marksman ‘sniper’ with an M1917 Enfield rifle. The fighting force of the platoon consisted of three squads of around 8 men, each squad having a three-man automatic weapons group (usually with one either of a BAR or Lewis gun) and a rifle/bomb group armed with M1917 rifles, grenades and sticky-bombs, and a Thompson or Sten sub-machine gun if possible. Men without rifles should all have shotguns, if available. The basic tactical principle was ‘aggressive defence’; fire would be held until the enemy were within the defensive perimeter of the town in force and they would then be attacked with concentrated firepower of bombs, grenades, shotguns and automatic weapons (as much as possible from above and from the rear), with the object of forcing them into cover close by. Retreating enemy forces would be counterattacked (again preferably from the rear), the automatic weapons group of each squad providing covering fire while the bombing group attacked with grenades, submachine guns and shotguns. As many Germans as possible should be killed, and no prisoners would be taken.
Battle tactics were derived substantially from the experience of Spanish Republican forces although they also drew on the experience of the British Army (and the IRA) in Ireland. The emphasis was on drawing the Germans into fighting in central urban areas at short ranges, where stone buildings would provide cover; lines of communication between units would be short; the Home Guard’s powerful arsenal of shotguns, bombs and grenades would be most effective; and German tanks and vehicles would be constrained by narrow, winding streets.
The Home Guard had a number of secret roles. That included sabotage units who would disable factories and petrol installations following the invasion. Members with outdoor survival skills and experience (especially as gamekeepers or poachers) could be recruited into the Auxiliary Units, an extremely secretive force of more highly trained guerrilla units with the task of hiding behind enemy lines after an invasion, emerging to attack and destroy supply dumps, disabling tanks and trucks, assassinating collaborators, and killing sentries and senior German officers with sniper rifles.[13] They would operate from pre-prepared secret underground bases, excavated at night with no official records, in woods, in caves, or otherwise concealed.
These concealed bases, upwards of 600 in number, were able to support units ranging in size from squads to companies. In the event of an invasion, all Auxiliary Units would disappear into their operational bases and would not maintain contact with local Home Guard commanders, who should indeed be wholly unaware of their existence. Hence, although the Auxiliaries were Home Guard volunteers and wore Home Guard uniforms, they would not participate in the conventional phase of their town’s defence but would be activated once the local Home Guard defence had ended to inflict maximum mayhem and disruption over a further necessarily brief but violent period.
The high-principled and idealistic Woodrow Wilson was President of the United States between 1912 and 1920 and initially sought to avoid American involvement in the First World War. The US declared its neutrality on 19 August 1914.
Wilson was personally appalled by the evil of war and his faith in the processes of international justice committed him from the outset to an active role as mediator.
A series of diplomatic missions to belligerents between 1914 and 1916 was undertaken by his personal emissary Colonel House, in an attempt to seek a negotiated settlement. All failed, primarily because the warring nations were ultimately unwilling to compromise their mutually exclusive war aims.
Wilson’s role as an impartial mediator was also compromised by the war’s effects on his own country. The US economy benefitted hugely from supplying munitions and foodstuffs to the warring nation, but in so doing US ships became casualties of the war at sea.
Wilson’s exasperation with Britain over the Royal Navy’s searching of neutral vessels was completely overshadowed by the devastating effects of Germany’s unrestricted submarine war against neutral shipping – the ultimate consequence of which was the US declaration of war against Germany on 6 April 1917.
Wilson proved a decisive and forceful wartime leader, but despite his legal fair-mindedness and committee skills, the post-war Versailles Peace settlement proved an unhappy compromise. The US Congress rejected the treaty, including membership in the League of Nations, Wilson’s own proposed ideal institution for settling international disputes.

Nazi propaganda had told Wehrmacht’s soldiers the invasion of the Soviet Union was a war of extermination.
British historian Ian Kershaw concludes that the Wehrmacht’s duty was to ensure that the people who met Hitler’s requirements of being part of the Aryan Herrenvolk (“Aryan master race”) had living space. He wrote that:
The Nazi revolution was broader than just the Holocaust. Its second goal was to eliminate Slavs from central and eastern Europe and to create a Lebensraum for Aryans. … As Bartov (The Eastern Front; Hitler’s Army) shows, it barbarised the German armies on the eastern front. Most of their three million men, from generals to ordinary soldiers, helped exterminate captured Slav soldiers and civilians. This was sometimes cold and deliberate murder of individuals (as with Jews), sometimes generalised brutality and neglect. … German soldiers’ letters and memoirs reveal their terrible reasoning: Slavs were ‘the Asiatic-Bolshevik’ horde, an inferior but threatening race
During the rapid German advances in the early months of the war, nearly reaching the cities of Moscow and Leningrad, the bulk of Soviet industry which could not be evacuated was either destroyed or lost due to German occupation. Agricultural production was interrupted, with grain harvests left standing in the fields that would later cause hunger reminiscent of the early 1930s. In one of the greatest feats of war logistics, factories were evacuated on an enormous scale, with 1523 factories dismantled and shipped eastwards along four principal routes to the Caucasus, Central Asian, Ural, and Siberian regions. In general, the tools, dies and production technology were moved, along with the blueprints and their management, engineering staffs and skilled labor.
The whole of the Soviet Union became dedicated to the war effort. The population of the Soviet Union was probably better prepared than any other nation involved in the fighting of World War II to endure the material hardships of the war. This is primarily because the Soviets were so used to shortages and coping with economic crisis in the past, especially during wartime—World War I brought similar restrictions on food. Still, conditions were severe. World War II was especially devastating to Soviet citizens because it was fought on their territory and caused massive destruction. In Leningrad, under German siege, over one million people died of starvation and disease. Many factory workers were teenagers, women and the elderly. The government implemented rationing in 1941 and first applied it to bread, flour, cereal, pasta, butter, margarine, vegetable oil, meat, fish, sugar, and confectionery all across the country. The rations remained largely stable in other places during the war. Additional rations were often so expensive that they could not add substantially to a citizen’s food supply unless that person was especially well-paid. Peasants received no rations and had to make do with local resources that they farmed themselves. Most rural peasants struggled and lived in unbearable poverty, but others sold any surplus they had at a high price and a few became rouble millionaires, until a currency reform two years after the end of the war wiped out their wealth.
Despite harsh conditions, the war led to a spike in Soviet nationalism and unity. Soviet propaganda toned down extreme Communist rhetoric of the past as the people now rallied by a belief of protecting their Motherland against the evils of German invaders. Ethnic minorities thought to be collaborators were forced into exile. Religion, which was previously shunned, became a part of Communist Party propaganda campaign in the Soviet society in order to mobilize the religious elements.
The social composition of Soviet society changed drastically during the war. There was a burst of marriages in June and July 1941 between people about to be separated by the war and in the next few years the marriage rate dropped off steeply, with the birth rate following shortly thereafter to only about half of what it would have been in peacetime. For this reason mothers with several children during the war received substantial honours and money benefits if they had a sufficient number of children—mothers could earn around 1,300 roubles for having their fourth child and earn up to 5,000 roubles for their 10th.
German soldiers used to brand the bodies of captured partisan women – and other women as well – with the words “Whore for Hitler’s troops” and rape them. Following their capture some German soldiers vividly bragged about committing rape and rape-homicide. Susan Brownmiller argues that rape played a pivotal role in Nazi aim to conquer and destroy people they considered inferior, such as Jews, Russians, and Poles. An extensive list of rapes committed by German soldiers was compiled in the so-called “Molotov Note” in 1942. Brownmiller points out that Nazis used rape as a weapon of terror.
Examples of mass rapes in Soviet Union committed by German soldiers include
Smolensk: German command opened a brothel for officers in which hundreds of women and girls were driven by force, often by arms and hair.
Lviv: 32 women working in a garment factory were raped and murdered by German soldiers, in a public park. A priest trying to stop the atrocity was murdered.
Lviv: Germans soldiers raped Jewish girls, who were murdered after getting pregnant.
Soviet troops reportedly raped German women and girls, with total victim estimates ranging from tens of thousands to two million. During and after the occupation of Budapest, (Hungary), an estimated 50,000 women and girls were raped. Regarding rapes that took place in Yugoslavia, Stalin responded to a Yugoslav partisan leader’s complaints saying, “Can’t he understand it if a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometres through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle?”
In former Axis countries, such as Germany, Romania and Hungary, Red Army officers generally viewed cities, villages and farms as being open to pillaging and looting. For example, Red Army soldiers and NKVD members frequently looted transport trains in 1944 and 1945 in Poland and Soviet soldiers set fire to the city centre of Demmin while preventing the inhabitants from extinguishing the blaze, which, along with multiple rapes, played a part in causing over 900 citizens of the city to commit suicide. In the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, when members of the SED reported to Stalin that looting and rapes by Soviet soldiers could result in negative consequences for the future of socialism in post-war East Germany, Stalin reacted angrily: “I shall not tolerate anybody dragging the honour of the Red Army through the mud.” Accordingly, all evidence of looting, rapes and destruction by the Red Army was deleted from archives in the Soviet occupation zone.
According to recent figures, of an estimated 4 million POWs taken by the Russians, including Germans, Japanese, Hungarians, Romanians and others, some 580,000 never returned, presumably victims of privation or the Gulags, compared with 3.5 million Soviet POW who died in German camps out of the 5.6 million taken.
After the Munich Agreement, the Soviet Union pursued a rapprochement with Nazi Germany. On 23 August 1939 the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Germany which included a secret protocol that divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet “spheres of influence“, anticipating potential “territorial and political rearrangements” of these countries. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, starting World War II. The Soviets invaded eastern Poland on 17 September. Following the Winter War with Finland, the Soviets were ceded territories by Finland. This was followed by annexations of the Baltic states and parts of Romania.
On 22 June 1941, Hitler launched an invasion of the Soviet Union with the largest invasion force in history, leading to some of the largest battles and most horrific atrocities. Operation Barbarossa comprised three army groups. The city of Leningrad was besieged while other major cities fell to the Germans during the invasion. Despite initial successes, the German offensive halted to a stop in the Battle of Moscow, and the Soviets launched a counteroffensive, pushing the Germans back. The failure of Operation Barbarossa reversed the fortunes of Germany. Stalin was confident that the Allied war machine would eventually defeat Germany. The Soviet Union repulsed Axis attacks, such as in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of Kursk, which marked a turning point in the war. The Western Allies provided support to the Soviets in the form of Lend-Lease as well as air and naval support. Stalin met with Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference and discussed a two-front war against Germany and the future of Europe after the war. The Soviets launched successful offensives to regain territorial losses and began a push to Berlin. The Germans unconditionally surrendered in May 1945 after Berlin fell.
The bulk of Soviet fighting took place on the Eastern Front—including the Continuation War with Finland—but it also invaded Iran in August 1941 with the British, and the Soviets later entered the war against Japan in August 1945, which began with an invasion of Manchuria. The Soviets had border conflicts with Japan up to 1939 before signing a non-aggression pact with Japan in 1941. Stalin had agreed with the Western Allies to enter the war against Japan at the Tehran Conference in 1943 and at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 once Germany was defeated. The entry of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan along with the atomic bombings by the United States led to Japan to surrender, marking the end of World War II.
The Soviet Union suffered the greatest number of casualties in the war, losing more than 20 million citizens, about a third of all World War II casualties. The full demographic loss to the Soviet people was even greater.The German Generalplan Ost aimed to create more Lebensraum (lit. ’living space’) for Germany through extermination. An estimated 3.5 million Soviet prisoners of war died in German captivity as a result of deliberate mistreatment and atrocities, and millions of civilians, including Soviet Jews, were killed in the Holocaust. However, at the expense of a large sacrifice, the Soviet Union emerged as a global superpower.[6] The Soviets installed dependent communist governments in Eastern Europe, and tensions with the United States became known as the Cold War.
Main articles: Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and Soviet–German relations before 1941

During the 1930s, Soviet foreign minister Maxim Litvinov emerged as a leading voice for the official Soviet policy of collective security with the Western powers against Nazi Germany. In 1935, Litvinov negotiated treaties of mutual assistance with France and with Czechoslovakia with the aim of containing Hitler’s expansion.[8] After the Munich Agreement, which gave parts of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany, the Western democracies’ policy of appeasement led the Soviet Union to reorient its foreign policy towards a rapprochement with Germany. On 3 May 1939, Stalin replaced Litvinov, who was closely identified with the anti-German position, with Vyacheslav Molotov.
In August 1939, Stalin accepted Hitler’s proposal into a non-aggression pact with Germany, negotiated by the foreign ministers Vyacheslav Molotov for the Soviets and Joachim von Ribbentrop for the Germans. Officially a non-aggression treaty only, an appended secret protocol, also reached on 23 August, divided the whole of eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. The USSR was promised the eastern part of Poland, then primarily populated by Ukrainians and Belarusians, in case of its dissolution, and Germany recognised Latvia, Estonia and Finland as parts of the Soviet sphere of influence,[11] with Lithuania added in a second secret protocol in September 1939. Another clause of the treaty was that Bessarabia, then part of Romania, was to be joined to the Moldovan SSR, and become the Moldovan SSR under control of Moscow.
The pact was reached two days after the breakdown of Soviet military talks with British and French representatives in August 1939 over a potential Franco-Anglo-Soviet alliance. Political discussions had been suspended on 2 August, when Molotov stated that they could not be resumed until progress was made in military talks late in August, after the talks had stalled over guarantees for the Baltic states, while the military talks upon which Molotov insisted started on 11 August. At the same time, Germany—with whom the Soviets had started secret negotiations on 29 July– argued that it could offer the Soviets better terms than Britain and France, with Ribbentrop insisting, “there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us.” German officials stated that, unlike Britain, Germany could permit the Soviets to continue their developments unmolested, and that “there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies of the West”. By that time, Molotov had obtained information regarding Anglo-German negotiations and a pessimistic report from the Soviet ambassador in France.

After disagreement regarding Stalin’s demand to move Red Army troops through Poland and Romania (which Poland and Romania opposed),on 21 August, the Soviets proposed adjournment of military talks using the pretext that the absence of the senior Soviet personnel at the talks interfered with the autumn manoeuvres of the Soviet forces, though the primary reason was the progress being made in the Soviet-German negotiations. That same day, Stalin received assurance that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would grant the Soviets land in Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania, after which Stalin telegrammed Hitler that night that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on 23 August. Regarding the larger issue of collective security, some historians state that one reason that Stalin decided to abandon the doctrine was the shaping of his views of France and Britain by their entry into the Munich Agreement and the subsequent failure to prevent the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. Stalin may also have viewed the pact as gaining time in an eventual war with Hitler in order to reinforce the Soviet military and shifting Soviet borders westwards, which would be militarily beneficial in such a war.
Stalin and Ribbentrop spent most of the night of the pact’s signing trading friendly stories about world affairs and cracking jokes (a rarity for Ribbentrop) about Britain’s weakness, and the pair even joked about how the Anti-Comintern Pact principally scared “British shopkeepers.” They further traded toasts, with Stalin proposing a toast to Hitler’s health and Ribbentrop proposing a toast to Stalin.

On 1 September 1939, the German invasion of its agreed upon portion of Poland started the Second World War.[9] On 17 September the Red Army invaded eastern Poland and occupied the Polish territory assigned to it by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, followed by co-ordination with German forces in Poland.Eleven days later, the secret protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was modified, allotting Germany a larger part of Poland, while ceding most of Lithuania to the Soviet Union. The Soviet portions lay east of the so-called Curzon Line, an ethnographic frontier between Russia and Poland drawn up by a commission of the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.


After taking around 300,000 Polish prisoners in 1939 and early 1940, NKVD officers conducted lengthy interrogations of the prisoners in camps that were, in effect, a selection process to determine who would be killed.On March 5, 1940, pursuant to a note to Stalin from Lavrenty Beria, the members of the Soviet Politburo (including Stalin) signed and 22,000 military and intellectuals were executed – They were labelled “nationalists and counterrevolutionaries”, kept at camps and prisons in occupied western Ukraine and Belarus. This became known as the Katyn massacre. Major-General Vasili M. Blokhin, chief executioner for the NKVD, personally shot 6,000 of the captured Polish officers in 28 consecutive nights, which remains one of the most organized and protracted mass murders by a single individual on record. During his 29-year career Blokhin shot an estimated 50,000 people, making him ostensibly the most prolific official executioner in recorded world history.
In August 1939, Stalin declared that he was going to “solve the Baltic problem, and thereafter, forced Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to sign treaties for “mutual assistance.”
In November 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland. The Finnish defensive effort defied Soviet expectations, and after stiff losses, as well as the unsuccessful attempt to install a puppet government in Helsinki, Stalin settled for an interim peace granting the Soviet Union parts of Karelia and Salla (9% of Finnish territory). Soviet official casualty counts in the war exceeded 200,000, while Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev later claimed the casualties may have been one million. After this campaign, Stalin took actions to modify training and improve propaganda efforts in the Soviet military.
In mid-June 1940, when international attention was focused on the German invasion of France, Soviet NKVD troops raided border posts in the Baltic countries.Stalin claimed that the mutual assistance treaties had been violated, and gave six-hour ultimatums for new governments to be formed in each country, including lists of persons for cabinet posts provided by the Kremlin. Thereafter, state administrations were liquidated and replaced by Soviet cadres, followed by mass repression in which 34,250 Latvians, 75,000 Lithuanians and almost 60,000 Estonians were deported or killed. Elections for parliament and other offices were held with single candidates listed, the official results of which showed pro-Soviet candidates approval by 92.8 percent of the voters of Estonia, 97.6 percent of the voters in Latvia and 99.2 percent of the voters in Lithuania. The resulting peoples’ assemblies immediately requested admission into the USSR, which was granted. In late June 1940, Stalin directed the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, proclaiming this formerly Romanian territory part of the Moldavian SSR. But in annexing northern Bukovina, Stalin had gone beyond the agreed limits. The invasion of Bukovina violated the pact, as it went beyond the Soviet sphere of influence agreed with Germany.

After the Tripartite Pact was signed by Axis Powers Germany, Japan and Italy, in October 1940, Stalin personally wrote to Ribbentrop about entering an agreement regarding a “permanent basis” for their “mutual interests.” Stalin sent Molotov to Berlin to negotiate the terms for the Soviet Union to join the Axis and potentially enjoy the spoils of the pact. At Stalin’s direction, Molotov insisted on Soviet interest in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, though Stalin had earlier unsuccessfully personally lobbied Turkish leaders to not sign a mutual assistance pact with Britain and France. Ribbentrop asked Molotov to sign another secret protocol with the statement: “The focal point of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of the territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.” Molotov took the position that he could not take a “definite stand” on this without Stalin’s agreement. Stalin did not agree with the suggested protocol, and negotiations broke down. In response to a later German proposal, Stalin stated that the Soviets would join the Axis if Germany foreclosed acting in the Soviet’s sphere of influence. Shortly thereafter, Hitler issued a secret internal directive related to his plan to invade the Soviet Union.

In an effort to demonstrate peaceful intentions toward Germany, on 13 April 1941, Stalin oversaw the signing of a neutrality pact with Japan. Since the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia had been competing with Japan for spheres of influence in the Far East, where there was a power vacuum with the collapse of Imperial China. Although similar to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with the Third Reich, that Soviet Union signed Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact with the Empire of Japan, to maintain the national interest of Soviet’s sphere of influence in the European continent as well as the Far East conquest, whilst among the few countries in the world diplomatically recognizing Manchukuo, and allowed the rise of German invasion in Europe and Japanese aggression in Asia, but the Japanese defeat of Battles of Khalkhin Gol was the forceful factor to the temporary settlement before Soviet invasion of Manchuria in 1945 as the result of Yalta Conference. While Stalin had little faith in Japan’s commitment to neutrality, he felt that the pact was important for its political symbolism, to reinforce a public affection for Germany, before military confrontation when Hitler controlled Western Europe and for Soviet Union to take control Eastern Europe. Stalin felt that there was a growing split in German circles about whether Germany should initiate a war with the Soviet Union, though Stalin was not aware of Hitler’s further military ambition.
Further information: Operation Barbarossa and Continuation War
During the early morning of 22 June 1941, Hitler terminated the pact by launching Operation Barbarossa, the Axis invasion of Soviet-held territories and the Soviet Union that began the war on the Eastern Front. Before the invasion, Stalin thought that Germany would not attack the Soviet Union until Germany had defeated Britain. At the same time, Soviet generals warned Stalin that Germany had concentrated forces on its borders. Two highly placed Soviet spies in Germany, “Starshina” and “Korsikanets”, had sent dozens of reports to Moscow containing evidence of preparation for a German attack. Further warnings came from Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy in Tokyo working undercover as a German journalist who had penetrated deep into the German Embassy in Tokyo by seducing the wife of General Eugen Ott, the German ambassador to Japan.

Seven days before the invasion, a Soviet spy in Berlin, part of the Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) spy network, warned Stalin that the movement of German divisions to the borders was to wage war on the Soviet Union. Five days before the attack, Stalin received a report from a spy in the German Air Ministry that “all preparations by Germany for an armed attack on the Soviet Union have been completed, and the blow can be expected at any time.” In the margin, Stalin wrote to the people’s commissar for state security, “you can send your ‘source’ from the headquarters of German aviation to his mother. This is not a ‘source’ but a dezinformator.” Although Stalin increased Soviet western border forces to 2.7 million men and ordered them to expect a possible German invasion, he did not order a full-scale mobilisation of forces to prepare for an attack.Stalin felt that a mobilization might provoke Hitler to prematurely begin to wage war against the Soviet Union, which Stalin wanted to delay until 1942 in order to strengthen Soviet forces.
In the initial hours after the German attack began, Stalin hesitated, wanting to ensure that the German attack was sanctioned by Hitler, rather than the unauthorized action of a rogue general.Accounts by Nikita Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan claim that, after the invasion, Stalin retreated to his dacha in despair for several days and did not participate in leadership decisions. But, some documentary evidence of orders given by Stalin contradicts these accounts, leading historians such as Roberts to speculate that Khrushchev’s account is inaccurate.
Stalin soon quickly made himself a Marshal of the Soviet Union, then country’s highest military rank and Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces aside from being Premier and General-Secretary of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union that made him the leader of the nation, as well as the People’s Commissar for Defence, which is equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of War at that time and the U.K. Minister of Defence and formed the State Defense Committee to coordinate military operations with himself also as chairman. He chaired the Stavka, the highest defense organisation of the country. Meanwhile, Marshal Georgy Zhukov was named to be the Deputy Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In the first three weeks of the invasion, as the Soviet Union tried to defend itself against large German advances, it suffered 750,000 casualties, and lost 10,000 tanks and 4,000 aircraft.[70] In July 1941, Stalin completely reorganized the Soviet military, placing himself directly in charge of several military organizations. This gave him complete control of his country’s entire war effort; more control than any other leader in World War II
A pattern soon emerged where Stalin embraced the Red Army‘s strategy of conducting multiple offensives, while the Germans overran each of the resulting small, newly gained grounds, dealing the Soviets severe casualties.[72] The most notable example of this was the Battle of Kiev, where over 600,000 Soviet troops were quickly killed, captured or missing.
By the end of 1941, the Soviet military had suffered 4.3 million casualties and the Germans had captured 3.0 million Soviet prisoners, 2.0 million of whom died in German captivity by February 1942. German forces had advanced c. 1,700 kilometres, and maintained a linearly-measured front of 3,000 kilometres. The Red Army put up fierce resistance during the war’s early stages. Even so, according to Glantz, they were plagued by an ineffective defence doctrine against well-trained and experienced German forces, despite possessing some modern Soviet equipment, such as the KV-1 and T-34 tanks.
Further information: Eastern Front (World War II), Battle of Moscow, Battle of Stalingrad, and Azerbaijan in World War II
While the Germans made huge advances in 1941, killing millions of Soviet soldiers, at Stalin’s direction the Red Army directed sizable resources to prevent the Germans from achieving one of their key strategic goals, the attempted capture of Leningrad. They held the city at the cost of more than a million Soviet soldiers in the region and more than a million civilians, many of whom died from starvation.
While the Germans pressed forward, Stalin was confident of an eventual Allied victory over Germany. In September 1941, Stalin told British diplomats that he wanted two agreements: (1) a mutual assistance/aid pact and (2) a recognition that, after the war, the Soviet Union would gain the territories in countries that it had taken pursuant to its division of Eastern Europe with Hitler in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The British agreed to assistance but refused to agree to the territorial gains, which Stalin accepted months later as the military situation had deteriorated somewhat by mid-1942. On 6 November 1941, Stalin rallied his generals in a speech given underground in Moscow, telling them that the German blitzkrieg would fail because of weaknesses in the German rear in Nazi-occupied Europe and the underestimation of the strength of the Red Army, and that the German war effort would crumble against the Anglo-American-Soviet “war engine”.
Correctly calculating that Hitler would direct efforts to capture Moscow, Stalin concentrated his forces to defend the city, including numerous divisions transferred from Soviet eastern sectors after he determined that Japan would not attempt an attack in those areas. By December, Hitler’s troops had advanced to within 25 kilometres (16 mi) of the Kremlin in Moscow. On 5 December, the Soviets launched a counteroffensive, pushing German troops back c. 80 kilometres (50 mi) from Moscow in what was the first major defeat of the Wehrmacht in the war.

In early 1942, the Soviets began a series of offensives labelled “Stalin’s First Strategic Offensives”. The counteroffensive bogged down, in part due to mud from rain in the spring of 1942. Stalin’s attempt to retake Kharkov in the Ukraine ended in the disastrous encirclement of Soviet forces, with over 200,000 Soviet casualties suffered. Stalin attacked the competence of the generals involved.General Georgy Zhukov and others subsequently revealed that some of those generals had wished to remain in a defensive posture in the region, but Stalin and others had pushed for the offensive. Some historians have doubted Zhukov’s account.

At the same time, Hitler was worried about American popular support after the U.S. entry into the war following the Attack on Pearl Harbor, and a potential Anglo-American invasion on the Western Front in 1942 (which did not occur until the summer of 1944). He changed his primary goal from an immediate victory in the East, to the more long-term goal of securing the southern Soviet Union to protect oil fields vital to the long-term German war effort.While Red Army generals correctly judged the evidence that Hitler would shift his efforts south, Stalin thought it a flanking move in the German attempt to take Moscow.
The German southern campaign began with a push to capture the Crimea, which ended in disaster for the Red Army. Stalin publicly criticised his generals’ leadership. In their southern campaigns, the Germans took 625,000 Red Army prisoners in July and August 1942 alone.At the same time, in a meeting in Moscow, Churchill privately told Stalin that the British and Americans were not yet prepared to make an amphibious landing against a fortified Nazi-held French coast in 1942, and would direct their efforts to invading German-held North Africa. He pledged a campaign of massive strategic bombing, to include German civilian targets.[84]
Estimating that the Russians were “finished,” the Germans began another southern operation in the autumn of 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad. Hitler insisted upon splitting German southern forces in a simultaneous siege of Stalingrad and an offensive against Baku on the Caspian Sea. Stalin directed his generals to spare no effort to defend Stalingrad. Although the Soviets suffered in excess of more than 2 million casualties at Stalingrad,their victory over German forces, including the encirclement of 290,000 Axis troops, marked a turning point in the war.
Within a year after Barbarossa, Stalin reopened the churches in the Soviet Union. He may have wanted to motivate the majority of the population who had Christian beliefs. By changing the official policy of the party and the state towards religion, he could engage the Church and its clergy in mobilising the war effort. On 4 September 1943, Stalin invited the metropolitans Sergius, Alexy and Nikolay to the Kremlin. He proposed to reestablish the Moscow Patriarchate, which had been suspended since 1925, and elect the Patriarch. On 8 September 1943, Metropolitan Sergius was elected Patriarch. One account said that Stalin’s re
Our volunteer online buddies do like to keep team work going, with a little competitiveness. Tuesday, I am usually over the starting line first, but on this occasion, I happened to be last over the finishing line finishing. Oh dear!, Better luck next timework next time.



I had a nice walk around The Field at Churchill Playing Fields with my Dad this afternoon. It is the field behind Holywell Avenue in Monkseaton then we came straight home as you can see it was nice and sunny when we were out to.